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Section 2-318 of the UCC: the Sleeping Giant
William Michael Karnes*
T -HE ACCEPTANCE, APPLICATION, AND DEVELOPMENT Of Section 2-318 of
the Uniform Commercial Code' has caused more trouble and con-
fusion than the appearance of Darwin's theory of evolution in Tennes-
see.2 Overlooking the obvious possible solution of amending Section
2-318, most states have retained a written but unexercised statute and
thereby compelled courts to stretch, bend and squeeze breach of war-
ranty into the realm of strict liability in tort. Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts reads:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm
to User or Consumer,
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Although Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) Torts and
Section 2-318 in an amended form may ultimately achieve similar re-
sults, why plod through the privity quagmire or circumvent it with strict
liability in tort when Section 2-318 in an amended form will provide a
statutory route which will alleviate the vexation?
Growth and Development
Prior to the twentieth century, the manufacturer-seller dealt face
to face with the consumer. With the onslaught of mass production, there
arose the need for a middleman retailer to facilitate the manufacturer's
sale to the ultimate consumer. Because the privity requirement of con-
* B.A., John Carroll University; Third-year student, Cleveland State University Col-
lege of Law.
1 The Uniform Commercial Code (1968 version) hereinafter referred to as "the
Code" or "the UCC."
2 Scopes v. State, 152 Tenn. 424, 278 S.W. 57 (1925); 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363
(1927).
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tracts provided insulation for manufacturers and sellers3 from liability
for defects in products, a crisis began to evolve within the law of sales.
Since the law of sales failed to deal with the supervention of the re-
tailer, Justice Cardozo held in McPherson v. Buick Motor Company,4
that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort regardless of privity.
The door was now opened for consumer protection by applying
strict liability in tort. State supreme courts, recognizing the need for
prompt action in the area of unwholesome food, confused tort and
warranty by cloaking consumer recovery under the guise of "public
policy." 5
In Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps,6 Jacob E. Decker & Sons,
Inc. manufactured, packaged and sold sausage to a retail merchant in
Texas. The Capp family purchased and consumed the sausage which
was contaminated, and as a result one of the children died and the other
members became seriously ill. The jury found that neither the manu-
facturer nor the consumers were negligent, but the Supreme Court of
Texas held the manufacturer liable "under an implied warranty im-
posed by operation of law as a matter of public policy." 7
Since the application of tort liability to unwholesome food, strict
liability in tort has exploded into almost every sphere of manufacturing
and sales.
In 1964, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the doctrine
of the Decker case in Putman v. Erie City Manufacturing Co.8 The de-
fendant company, a Pennsylvania corporation, assembled a wheel chair
and sold it to a Texas retail druggist who in turn rented the wheel
chair to Mr. Putman. While Putman was using the chair, a wheel came
off as the result of a defective fork stem and Putman refractured both
his legs.
By applying Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,9 the Circuit Court
felt the Supreme Court of Texas would in all probability have extended
liability in the present situation and declared the manufacturer and
assembler of a rented wheel chair strictly liable in tort to the injured
plaintiff.
It should be noted, however, that the Restatement (Second), Torts
instead of being a restatement of general law in the United States is
3 Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 242, 11 N.E. 785 (1916) (adulterated pork chops);
Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, 80 N.E. 482 (1907) (Warranty does
not run with goods).
4 McPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc., v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942); Pros-
ser, Law of Torts, § 97 p. 673 (3rd ed. 1964), summary of policy argument.
6 Jacob Decker & Sons, Id. at 828.
7 Id. at 829.
s Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
9 Putnam v. Erie City Manufacturing Co., 338 F. 2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
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really a prognostication of what the law is to become.10 At present,
tort products liability runs the gambit from animal food 1 to permanent
wave solutions 12 to vaccines. 13
Inadequate Legislation Caused Confused Application
With the adoption of Article 2 of the UCC, the tort approach to
product liability cases has been modified. This article has arisen to fill
the void between contract and tort in the law of sales; since Article 2
mingles contract law and tort law, it is sui generis.
After the code was adopted, confusion arose in the application of
Section 2-318 and in its relationship to tort. In Pennsylvania, for ex-
ample, confusion arose in Miller v. Preitz14 when the court could not
reconcile vertical and horizontal privity'15 with Section 2-3181G of the
Code. The majority opinion stated that an infant who was scalded to
death by a defective vaporizer was not in privity with the manufac-
turer or seller since his aunt had purchased the vaporizer. The court
went on to state that even the aunt could not have sued the remote
manufacturer-seller for breach of warranty because the purchaser
could only sue the remote manufacturer-seller in cases involving goods
for human consumption. In such instances, strict liability in tort must
be applied to circumvent the requirement of privity of contract in
warranty actions. Thus, the court interpreted Section 2-318 as being
very restrictive and expressly listing exceptions to the privity re-
quirement.
Two years later, the Miller case requirement of vertical privity of
contract was overruled in Kassab v. Central Soya.17 Here the court
10 Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A Petition for Re-
hearing, 42 U. Det. L.J. 343, 344 (1965).
11 McAffee v. Cargill Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
12 Rogers vs. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
13 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
14 Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A. 2d 320 (1966): Defective vaporizer purchased
by aunt caused death of nephew living next door.
15 "Vertical privity exists where the actual purchaser proceeds against his remote
vendor. His direction is upward, through the series of sales which culminated in his
purchase. Horizontal privity on the other hand, begins with the user of the product
and ends with the ultimate purchaser. The user's movement is across as he attempts
to reach the legal position occupied by the purchaser." Swartzkopf, Products Li-
ability: Employees and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Dick L. Rev. 444, 446
(1963).
16 Purdon's Penna. Stats. Ann., Title 12A (1964). Section 2-318, Third Party Bene-
ficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied.
Alternative A
"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume, or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
17 Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A. 2d 848 (1968). Allowed purchaser of
defective cattle feed to recover against remote manufacturer under § 2-318.
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reinterpreted Section 2-318 and decided that the "natural person who
is in the family or household of his buyer, or who is a guest in his
home" 18 provided limitations to recovery under horizontal privity. The
court reasoned that Section 2-318 was silent and did not set any limita-
tions upon recovery under vertical privity. Referring to the Code's
comment19 permitting freedom of developing case law, the court de-
clared that a purchaser could recover against a remote seller. However,
the court clearly reiterated that the Kassab case in no way expanded
recovery pertaining to a person who was in horizontal privity.
The Kassab case is an excellent example of employing case law
to expand a statute to its limits without legislating. However, neither
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor any other state supreme court
may expand consumer protection under the Code in states which per-
sist in retaining Section 2-318, Alternative A.20 Consider for example,
Ohio, which has retained but not used this statute. The Ohio Supreme
Court, shackled by the privity morass, recognized a tort action based
on breach of implied warranty. In Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.,21
a subcontractor's ironworker was injured on a construction site when
certain defective steel joists which had been sold by the defendant to
the general contractor collapsed. Since Section 2-318 Alternative A is
so restrictive, the plaintiff was compelled to pursue a cause of action
in tort for breach of implied warranty of fitness for use. As long as
Section 2-318 Alternative A is retained, courts will be compelled to
provide an injured consumer with a tort remedy or else no remedy at
all.
If At First You Don't Succeed...
In view of developing case law in the area of products liability, the
drafters of the Code subsequently provided Alternatives B 22 and C
to Section 2-318. These alternatives are meaningless unless they are
adopted by state legislatures. Alternative C is of sufficient import
so as not to be relegated to a footnote:
18 Supra n. 16.
19 "Beyond this, the section in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge
or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain." UCC § 2-318,
Cmmt. 3.
20 Supra n. 16.
21 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corporation, 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E. 2d 185 (1966).
22 Section 2-318, Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied.
Alternative B
"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section."
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SECTION 2-318. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF WARRANTIES EX-
PRESS OR IMPLIED.
Alternative C.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with
respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the war-
ranty extends.
As stated before, Article 2 of the Code intended to complement,
rather than supplant, tort law in the area of sales. However, Section
2-318 may supersede Section 402A of the Restatement. This purpose is
explicitly mentioned in the comments to the Section. 23
Alternative C, being a hybrid of torts and contract is a statutory
declaration of strict products liability.
The power to solve the privity dilemma lies unused in the hands
of many state legislatures. Since Section 2-318, Alternative A has not
adequately dealt with the privity problem, state legislatures should
develop Section 2-318. States such as Ohio,24 Pennsylvania, 23 New
York,20 and Illinois2 7 lack any case law development of the section
beyond its narrow confines elicited by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania. The conclusion is that state courts are at a loss to apply Section
2-318 until state legislatures untie their hands.
Eliminating Privity
Rather than adopt the 1962 Official Text of Section 2-318 of the
UCC which did not include Alternatives B and C, the state legislature
of Virginia foresaw the problems which would plague courts and plain-
tiffs. Since the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was strictly adhering
to the privity requirement, except cases dealing with sealed food con-
tainers2 s and inherently dangerous products,2 9 the state legislature
adopted their own version of Section 2-318 titled: "When Lack of Priv-
23 "The third alternative goes further, following the trend of modern decisions as
indicated by Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1965) in ex-
tending the rule beyond injuries to the person.
24 Ohio Rev. Code, Ann., Title 13, § 1302.31 (1962).
25 Supra n. 15.
26 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann., Book 62 , Part I, § 2-318
(1964).
27 Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes, Chapter 26, § 2-318 (1963).
28 Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E. 2d 203 (1959).
29 General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 122 S.E. 2d 548 (1961).
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ity No Defense In Action Against Manufacturer or Seller of Goods." 30
The result of this legislation was the imposition of strict products liabil-
ity under the Code "if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer
or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be af-
fected by the goods." 31
In 1967, The District Court of Maryland stated in Debbis v. Hertz
Corp.,32 that Section 2-318 of the UCC enacted in Maryland in 1964
eliminated the privity requirement only with regard to a buyer's family,
household, and guests. In this case, Mrs. Debbis was suing for the
wrongful death of her husband whose automobile was struck from the
rear by an automobile with defective brakes which had been leased to
a third party by the defendant corporation. The District Court stated
that the plaintiff had to amend her complaint and pursue an action in
tort rather than breach of an implied warranty of fitness. The court
reasoned that the lack of privity between the plaintiff's deceased hus-
band and the defendant lessor precluded her from pursuing the breach
of warranty action.
The state legislature, in an effort to rectify the restriction of their
statute, amended Section 2-318 in 1969 by adding the words "of any
other ultimate consumer or user of the goods or person affected there-
by," 33 to the first sentence. As a result, recovery for breach of warranty
is no longer hampered by the privity requirement which has insulated
manufacturers and remote sellers for over a century and a quarter.34
Attempted Efforts To Find A Solution
The other solution to Section 2-318, Alternative A is to follow
the examples set by California and Utah. When the UCC was adopted
by the California State Legislature in 1963, Section 2-318 was not
30 Code of Virginia, § 8.2-318. When Lack of Privity No Defense in Action Against
Manufacturer or Seller of Goods.
"Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any
action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages
for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plain-
tiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person
whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, con-
sume, or be affected by the goods; . . ." (Effective June 30, 1962).
31 Id. Cf. Wyoming Statutes § 34-2-318 (1969 Cumulative Supplement) for similar
legislation.
32 Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp. 671 (D. Md. 1967).
33 Annotated Code of Maryland Title 8B, § 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of War-
ranties Express or Implied.
"A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home or any other ultimate consumer or user of the goods or person affected
thereby if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty."
(1969 Cumulative Supplement).
34 The privity-of-contract doctrine is considered to have materialized in the case of
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex 1842).
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enacted. The comment following the omission stated that the Section
"in its present form" 35 was not suitable and would be "a step back-
ward" 36 from the developing case law on products liability. When Utah
adopted the Code in 1966, it omitted Section 2-318 without comment
as to why it was deleted.37
Thus, California and Utah have chosen the Restatement (Second),
Torts approach in imposing strict products liability. In 1962, the Su-
preme Court of California abolished the privity requirement by declar-
ing in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,38 that the manufacturer of
a defective combination power tool was strictly liable in tort for
the injuries sustained by the user.
Was this decision a "choice" between a sales remedy and a tort
remedy, or was it really a question of strict liability in tort or no
liability at all? Was not the Supreme Court of Ohio subsequently faced
with a similar "choice" of tort liability or no liability in Lonzrick v.
Republic Steel Corp.39 because of the insufficiency of Section 2-318,
Alternative A?
Conclusion
The means to alleviate the tort-contract dichotomy is present in
Alternatives B and C of Section 2-318 of the Code. The legal fictions
and public policy arguments may be reduced to statutory reality if state
legislatures would seize the initiative and recognize breach of warranty
in the law of sales.
California's argument for not enacting Section 2-31840 is no longer
valid since the subsequent addition of alternatives B and C to Section
2-318. Either alternative or a reasonable facsimile would greatly en-
hance and facilitate case law development in products liability. Since
Utah was prompted to omit Section 2-318 without any explanation, that
state should now seize the opportunity to enact an alternative to Section
2-318 for the purpose of codifying and facilitating consumer protection.
For those states retaining the original draft of Section 2-318, the
only way to disperse the resultant confusion is to amend and clarify the
source of the trouble. "The law cannot be defective in dispensing jus-
tice." 41
35 It should be noted that "in its present form" referred to section 2-318 without
Alternatives B and C which were subsequently added by the drafters of the Code.
36 West's Ann. Cal. Codes, Commercial § 2-318, Cmmt 1.
37 Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 70A-2-318 (1966).
38 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P. 2d 897 (1962).
39 Supra n. 21.
40 Cf. Supra n. 35 and n. 36.
41 Lex deficere non potest in justitia exhibenda. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1054,
(4th Ed. Rev. 1968).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
